Abstract. We introduce the notion of an extractable hash proof system. Essentially, this is a special kind of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge system where the secret keys may be generated in one of two modes to allow for either simulation or extraction.
Introduction
The most basic security guarantee we require of a public key encryption scheme (PKE) is that of semantic security against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) [21] : it is infeasible to learn anything about the plaintext from the ciphertext. On the other hand, there is a general consensus within the cryptographic research community that in virtually every practical application, we require semantic security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) [37, 15] , wherein an adversary is given access to decryptions of ciphertexts of her choice. So far, there have been two largely separate lines of works addressing the construction of CCA-secure encryption schemes: the first examines constructions from general assumptions starting with the beautiful works of Dolev, Dwork, Naor and Yung [15, 34, 37, 39, 31, 18, 36, 38, 33, 29] and related questions pertaining to minimal assumptions; the second examines practical and efficient constructions from specific number-theoretic assumptions, starting from those of Cramer and Shoup [11, 40, 12, 30, 2, 24, 9, 10, 25] . In recent years, two distinct trends have surfaced in each of these lines of works.
Practical CCA from Search Problems. Until very recently, all of the practical CCA-secure encryption schemes (namely the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme and all its variants) inherently relied on decisional assumptions, e.g., the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption or the quadratic residuosity assumption. In general, decisional assumptions are a much stronger class of assumptions than computational assumptions based on search problems, such as factoring, finding shortest vectors in lattices, or even the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. Indeed, there are groups, such as certain elliptic curve groups with bilinear pairing map, where the DDH assumption does not hold, but the Computational DiffieHellman (CDH) problem appears to be hard. As such, schemes based on search problems are generally preferred to those based on decisional assumptions. However, such schemes seem to be very hard to obtain.
Several years ago, Canetti, Halevi and Katz [9] proposed the first practical CCA-secure PKE based on a computational assumption, namely the Bilinear DH assumption in bilinear groups (BDH). Since then, a series of works have shown how to base CCA-secure encryption schemes on CDH [10, 22, 23] and on hardness of factoring [25] . However, there seems to be no overarching framework explaining these schemes. Partial progress towards a unifying approach was made recently by Cramer, Hofheinz and Kiltz [13] ; their approach remains unsatisfactory in two ways: first, it does not encompass constructions from hardness of factoring (it does cover the RSA assumption, which is possibly a stronger assumption), and second, the ensuing schemes even with suitable algebraic optimizations, do not quite match the efficiencies obtained in preceding works (for instance, the public key in the RSA-based scheme contains a linear number of group elements, whereas that in the factoring-based scheme of Hofheinz and Kiltz [25] only requires a constant number of group elements).
CCA from weaker general assumptions. Since the breakthrough work of Peikert and Waters on lossy trapdoor functions [36] , a series of works has identified successively weaker general assumptions from which we may realize CCA-secure encryption schemes [38, 29] (in a black-box way). The current state-of-the-art is the (tag-based) adaptive trapdoor functions of Kiltz, Mohassel and O'Neil [29] ; roughly speaking, these are trapdoor functions that remain one-way even if the adversary is given access to a restricted inversion oracle that inverts the function on "most" inputs. In spite of the black-box separations indicating that adaptive trapdoor functions are strictly weaker than its predecessors [29, 41] , all of the concrete (standard) assumptions from which we can realize adaptive trapdoor functions are not significantly different from those known to imply lossy trapdoor functions. Most notably, we do not know how to base adaptive trapdoor functions on hardness of factoring (or the standard RSA assumption, and more generally, any hard search problem not related to lattices). On the other hand, we do know how to derive CCA-secure encryption schemes from enhanced trapdoor permutations, which may in turn be based on hardness of factoring [15, 16, 19 ].
Our Contributions
We introduce the notion of an extractable hash proof system, inspired in part by the Cramer-Shoup universal hash proof systems [12] . Informally, extractable hash proofs are like universal hash proofs in that they are a special kind of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [4] , except we replace the soundness requirement (corresponding to smoothness) with a "proof of knowledge property" [37, 14] . That is, the secret keys may be generated in one of two modes to allow for either simulation or extraction. Using extractable hash proofs, we obtain new insights into the construction of CCA-secure encryption schemes, and obtain new results for both lines of works described earlier. Before we describe our results, we present an overview of extractable hash proofs.
Extractable Hash Proof Systems. Fix R to be a relation corresponding to some hard search problemnamely, R is efficiently samplable, but given a random u, it is hard to find an s such that (u, s) ∈ R. (For instance, s is the pre-image of u under a one-way permutation.) We consider a family of hash functions {H PK } indexed by a public key PK which maps an input u to some value. (We clarify that the name is somewhat of a misnomer since the "hash function" will in fact be injective, and possibly even lengthincreasing.) Moreover, we require that the hash function be efficiently computable given PK and the coin tosses r used to sample (u, s) ∈ R. We denote this public evaluation algorithm by Pub(PK, r) and the hash value by H PK (u).
Associated with this family of functions is a set-up algorithm that generates the public key PK along with a secret key. The set-up algorithm operates in one of two modes. In both modes, the algorithm generates exactly the same distribution of public keys; however, the functionality afforded by the secret key depends on the mode: -In the hashing mode, the secret key SK * allows us to compute the hash value Pub(PK, u) without knowing either s or r. Specifically, there is a private evaluation algorithm Priv such that for all (u, s) ∈ R, Priv(SK * , u) = H PK (u).
-In the extraction mode, the secret key SK allows us to verify whether a hash value is correctly computed and if so extract a witness s. More formally, there is an extraction algorithm Ext, such that for all u, τ :
This implies efficient verification of the hash value (given SK) whenever R is efficiently computable.
Looking ahead, we will rely on the extraction mode for decryption in a CCA-secure encryption scheme, and on the hashing mode for the proof of security. This is opposite to the use of universal hash proofs in the Cramer-Shoup framework, where the hashing mode is used for decryption and the smoothness property (corresponding to soundness and thus extraction) is used to establish security. Moreover, unlike CramerShoup hash proofs, extractable hash proofs are designed in tandem with families of relations, and are particularly well-suited for use with computationally hard search problems.
Practical CCA via Extractable Hash Proofs. We provide a generic construction of CCA-secure encryption schemes from extractable hash proofs. We use as an intermediate building block a somewhat richer cryptographic abstraction called all-but-one extractable hash proofs (which can be constructed generically from extractable hash proofs). The overall construction follows a variant of the Rackoff-Simon paradigm [37] (as opposed to the Naor-Yung double-encryption paradigm [34] , also used in [13] ): encrypt (or commit to) a one-time symmetric key (which is in turn used to encrypt the message, following the hybrid encryption paradigm), and then provide a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the key using an extractable hash proof. Indeed, such an approach was used implicitly in the afore-mentioned cryptosystems based on computational assumptions; however, the connection to the Rackoff-Simon paradigm has never been made explicit. Our framework may be viewed as a clarification and unification of all these constructions. We present extractable hash proofs related to hardness of factoring and CDH; in addition, we obtain the following new cryptosystems:
-a variant of the Hofheinz-Kiltz CCA-secure encryption scheme based on hardness of factoring (Fig 3) , which is more modular and both conceptually and mathematically simpler, albeit less efficient -there is a linear blow-up in both ciphertext overhead and public key size over the previous scheme;
-a CCA-secure encryption scheme based on CDH where the public key comprises a constant number of group elements (Fig 5) and a linear ciphertext overhead; previous works all require a linear number of group elements [10, 22, 23] in the public key. Our construction offers a trade-off between public key size and ciphertext overhead when compared with the schemes in [22, 23] ; such a trade-off may be preferable when encrypting very long messages via the hybrid encryption paradigm.
Our framework also encompasses a series of CCA-secure encryption schemes [9, 7, 27, 28] derived from the identity-based encryption schemes in [5, 8] whose security are based on decisional assumptions.
CCA from Adaptive Trapdoor Relations. We also propose a relaxation of adaptive trapdoor functions, which we call adaptive trapdoor relations. The relaxation here lies in the functionality requirement for evaluation: we only require that there exists an efficient sampling algorithm that generates a random input to the trapdoor function along with its image; the function itself need not be efficiently computable. It follows immediately from [29] (with essentially the same construction as that in [36, 38] ) that adaptive trapdoor relations imply CCA-secure encryption schemes. Interestingly, the ensuing construction unlike previous constructions, is not witness-recovering (that is, the decryption algorithm does not completely recover the randomness used for encryption, c.f. [36, Section 1.1]).
Next, we show how to derive adaptive trapdoor relations from hardness of factoring and CDH. This partially answers an open problem posed in [29] on realizing adaptive trapdoor functions from hard search problems not related to lattices. (A comparison with previous works is shown in Fig 1. ) Our construction relies on the use of extractable hash proofs and is very similar to our CCA-secure encryption schemes. Moreover, our adaptive trapdoor relations are fairly efficient and achieve parameters similar to the state-ofthe-art lossy trapdoor functions based on DCR and DDH respectively [17] 
Preliminaries and Definitions

Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) (Gen, Enc, Dec) with key-space {0, 1} k consists three polynomialtime algorithms.Via (PK, SK) ← Gen(1 k ) the randomized key-generation algorithm produces public/secret keys for security parameter 1 k ; via (C, K) ← Enc(PK), the randomized encapsulation algorithm creates a uniformly distributed symmetric key K ∈ {0, 1} k , together with a ciphertext C; via K ← Dec(SK, C), the possessor of secret key SK decrypts ciphertext C to get back a key K which is an element in {0, 1} k or a special reject symbol ⊥. For consistency, we require that for all k and all (C, K) ← Enc(PK), we have
, where the probability is taken over the choice (PK, SK) ← Gen(1 k ) and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
Chosen-Ciphertext Security. The common requirement for a KEM is indistinguishability against chosenciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) [12] where an adversary is allowed to adaptively query a decapsulation oracle with ciphertexts to obtain the corresponding session key. More formally, for an adversary A, we define the advantage function [12] that an IND-CCA secure KEM with a CCA-secure symmetric encryption scheme yields an IND-CCA secure hybrid encryption scheme.
Binary Relations for Search Problems
Fix a family of (binary) relations R PP indexed by a public parameter PP. We require that PP be efficiently samplable given a security parameter 1 k , and assume that all algorithms are given PP as part of its input. We omit PP henceforth whenever the context is clear. We will also require that R PP be efficiently verifiable (possibly given some trapdoor for PP) and efficiently samplable, where the sampling algorithm is denoted by SampR.
Intuitively, the relation R PP corresponds to a hard search problem, that is, given a random u, it is hard to find s such (u, s) ∈ R PP . More formally, we say that a binary relation R PP is one-way if:
-with overwhelming probability over PP, for all u, there exists at most one s such that (u, s) ∈ R PP ; and -there is an efficiently computable generator G such that G PP (s) is pseudorandom even against an adversary that gets PP, u and oracle access to R PP , where (u, s) ← R SampR(PP). (We will also refer to G as extracting hard-core bits from s.)
For relations where computing s given u is hard on average, we may derive a generator G PP with a one-bit output via the Goldreich-Levin hard-core bit GL(·) [20] (with the randomness in PP). In many cases as we shall see shortly, we may derive a linear number of hard-core bits by either iterating a one-way permutation or relying on decisional assumptions. Next, we present one-way relations related to hardness of factoring and the Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Iterated Squaring. Fix a Blum integer N = P Q for safe primes P, Q ≡ 3 (mod 4) (such that P = 2p + 1 and Q = 2q +1 for primes p, q). Following [26] , we work over the cyclic group of signed quadratic residues, given by the quotient group QR
N is a cyclic group of order pq and is efficiently recognizable (by verifying that the Jacobi symbol is +1). In addition, the map x → x 2 is a permutation over QR + N . Furthermore, assuming that factoring Blum integers are hard on average and that safe primes are dense, the family of permutations x → x 2 (indexed by N ) acting on the groups QR + N is one-way. In our constructions, the public parameter PP comprises (N, g), where N is a random 2k-bit Blum integer and g is chosen uniformly from QR + N . We will henceforth assume that g is a generator for QR + N , which happens with probability
We consider the relation:
The associated sampling algorithm SampR picks a random r ∈ [(N −1)/4] and outputs (g 2 k r , g r ). Note that the output distribution is statistically close to the uniform distribution over QR + N whenever g is a generator. Using the Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) pseudorandom generator [3] , we may extract k hard-core bits from s that are pseudorandom even given u, that is:
Diffie-Hellman Relation. We consider a family of groups G of prime order q. The public parameter PP is given by (g, g α ) for a random g ← R G and a random α ← R Z q . We consider the Diffie-Hellman relation
Note that R dh PP is efficiently verifiable in bilinear groups (by computing a pairing) or if provided with α as a trapdoor. The associated sampling algorithm SampR picks a r ← R Z q and outputs (g r , g αr ). Next, we explain how to obtain hard-core bits for R dh PP under various assumptions. -The Strong DH assumption assumption [1] asserts that computing g ab given (g, g a , g b ) is hard on average, even given oracle access to R (g,g a ) (·, ·) (note that in bilinear groups, this is equivalent to CDH).
Under Strong DH, we may extract a single hard-core bit from s using GL(s). -The Bilinear DDH (BDDH) assumption [6] asserts that e (g, g) abc is pseudorandom given g, g a , g b , g c where g, g a , g b , g c are random elements of a bilinear group. Under BDDH, we may extract a linear number of hard-core bits from s using:
where PP is now given by (g, g α , g γ ).
In addition, we may improve efficiency by pre-computing the pairing and setting PP to be (g, g α , e(g, g γ )) and computing G bddh PP (g r ) := e(g, g γ ) r . This construction extends naturally to the Gap Hashed DH assumption [28] .
Twin Diffie-Hellman Relation. As before, we consider a family of groups G of prime order q. The public parameter PP is now given by (g, g α , g β ) for a random g ← R G and random α, β ← R Z q . The Twin DiffieHellman relation [10] is given by:
The associated sampling algorithm SampR picks r ← R Z q and outputs (g r , (g αr , g βr )). Note that R 2dh PP is efficiently verifiable given (α, β) as a trapdoor. Given random PP, g r , the CDH assumption asserts that computing g αr is hard on average, and the DDH assumption asserts that g αr is pseudorandom. As shown in [10, Theorems 6 and 9], both problems remain hard even given oracle access to R 2dh PP (·, (·, ·)) under the respective assumptions. This means that under CDH, we may extract a single hard-core bit from (s 0 , s 1 ) by outputting GL(s 0 ) and under DDH, we may extract a linear number of hard-core bits by outputting s 0 .
Extractable Hash Proofs
We consider a family of hash functions {H PK } indexed by a public key PK. An extractable hash proof system associated with a one-way relation R PP is a tuple of algorithms (SetupExt, SetupHash, Pub, Ext, Priv) satisfying the following properties with overwhelming probability over PP:
(PUBLIC EVALUATION.) For all (PK, SK) ← SetupExt(PP) and (u, s) = SampR(r): Pub(PK, r) = H PK (u).
(EXTRACTION MODE.) For all (PK, SK) ← SetupExt(PP) and all (u, τ ):
The first outputs (namely PK) of SetupHash(PP) and SetupExt(PP) are statistically indistinguishable.
All-But-One Extractable Hash Proofs. For all of our applications, it is convenient to work with a richer abstraction, where as before, we consider a family of hash functions indexed by a public key PK, that takes a tag as an additional input. More formally, an all-but-one (ABO) extractable hash proof system is a tuple of algorithms (SetupExt, SetupABO, Pub, Ext, Ext * , Priv) satisfying the following properties with overwhelming probability over PP:
(PUBLIC EVALUATION.) For all PK, TAG and (u, s) = SampR(r): Pub(PK, TAG, r) = H PK (TAG, u).
(EXTRACTION MODE.) For all (PK, SK) ← SetupExt(PP) and all (TAG, u, τ ):
In addition, for all TAG ̸ = TAG * and all (u, τ ):
For all TAG * , the first outputs (namely PK) of SetupABO(PP, TAG * ) and SetupExt(PP) are statistically indistinguishable.
Trapdoor Functions.
Informally, trapdoor functions are a family of functions {F FID } that are easy to sample, compute and invert with trapdoor, and hard to invert without the trapdoor (in this work, we always assume that the functions are injective). In the tag-based setting, the function takes an additional input, namely the tag; also, the trapdoor is independent of the tag. A family of adaptive trapdoor functions [29] is one that remains one-way even if the adversary is given access to a inversion oracle, except the adversary cannot query the oracle on the same tag as that in the challenge.
Adaptive Trapdoor Relations. In this work, we consider a relaxation of the functionality guarantee for adaptive trapdoor functions, that is, instead of requiring that F FID be efficiently computable, we only require that we can efficiently sample from the distribution (s, F FID (TAG, s)) for a random s given FID, TAG. More precisely, a family of (tag-based) adaptive trapdoor relations is given by a family of injective functions {F FID } that satisfies the following properties: 
where A is allowed to query F 
Generic Constructions from Extractable Hash Proofs
In this section, we show that starting from an extractable hash proof, we may derive (1) a IND-CPA secure encryption scheme (as a simple warm-up exercise); (2) an ABO-extractable hash proof; (3) an ABOextractable hash proof with multiple hard-core bits; and finally, (4) a IND-CCA secure KEM.
CPA-Secure Encryption
Starting from an extractable hash proof (SetupExt, SetupHash, Pub, Ext, Ext * , Priv) for a one-way relation R PP with an associated generator G PP , we may derive a IND-CPA secure bit encryption scheme as follows:
-Gen(PP): same as SetupExt(PP).
-Enc(PK, b): sample (u, s) := SampR(r) and output (u, Pub(PK, r), G(s) ⊕ b).
-Dec (SK, (u, τ, c) ): compute s := Ext(SK, u, τ ) and return G(s) ⊕ c.
Observe that correctness of the encryption scheme follows readily from correctness of the extraction mode. To establish IND-CPA security, we consider an intermediate game where we generate (PK, SK * ) using SetupHash(PP) and computes H PK (u) in the ciphertext using Priv(SK * , u). Any adversary that can distinguish between encryptions of 0 and 1 in this game yields a distinguisher that given PP, u distinguishes G(s) from random.
From Extractable to ABO-Extractable
Starting from an extractable hash proof for a relation R PP , we may derive a ABO-extractable hash proof (SetupExt ′ , SetupABO ′ , Pub ′ , Ext ′ , Ext ′ * , Priv ′ ) for the same relation and tag space {0, 1} ℓ via a construction analogous to those in [34, 15, 36, 38] : 
Obtaining Multiple Hard-Core Bits
Starting from an ABO-extractable hash proof for a relation R PP , we may derive a ABO-extractable hash proof
This allows us to obtain more hard-core bits by using the k-wise direct product G ⊗k PP of G PP . The construction is as follows:
-SetupExt ′ and SetupABO ′ are the same as SetupExt and SetupABO respectively.
. . , ℓ, and output (s 1 , . . . , s k ).
CCA-Secure Encryption
Starting from an ABO-extractable hash proof for a one-way relation R PP along with a target collisionresistant hash function TCR, we may derive a IND-CCA KEM (Gen, Enc, Dec) as follows:
-Enc(PK): sample (u, s) := SampR(r), compute TAG := TCR(u), τ := Pub(PK, TAG, r), and return
We assume here that G PP has linear output length; if not, we first apply the transformation in Section 3.3. Proof. Observe that correctness of the encryption scheme follows readily from correctness of the extraction mode. We proceed to establish IND-CCA security. In the following, we write (u * , s * ) = SampR(r), C * = (u * , τ * ), K * 0 , K * 1 to denote the challenge ciphertext and keys chosen by the IND-CCA experiment, and we set TAG * to denote the tag TCR(u * ) used in computing C * . We proceed via a sequence of games. We start with Game 0, where the challenger proceeds like in the standard IND-CCA game (i.e, K * 0 is a real key and K * 1 is a random key) and end up with a game where both K * 0 and K * 1 are chosen uniformly at random. Then, we show that all games are indistinguishable under the assumption that G(s) is pseudorandom even given u. GAME 1: ELIMINATING COLLISIONS. We replace the decapsulation mechanism Dec with Dec ′ that outputs ⊥ on inputs (u, τ ) such that TCR(u) = TAG * but otherwise proceeds like Dec. We show that Games 0 and 1 are computationally indistinguishable, by arguing that Dec and Dec ′ essentially agree on all inputs (u, τ ). We consider three cases:
-case 1: TCR(u) ̸ = TAG * . Here, Dec and Dec ′ agree by definition.
-case 2: u ̸ = u * but TCR(u) = TCR(u * ) = TAG * . This only occurs with negligible probability, by target collision-resistance of TCR.
-case 3: u = u * but τ ̸ = τ * . This means τ ̸ = H PK (TAG * , u) and therefore Dec returns ⊥ and agrees with Dec ′ . GAME 2: DECAPSULATION WITH SetupABO. We modify the IND-CCA experiment from Game 1, we generate the keys (PK, SK * ) using SetupABO instead of SetupExt and we answer decapsulation queries using SK * instead of SK. More precisely, the IND-CCA experiment proceeds as follows:
and where we replace Dec ′ (SK, ·) from Game 1 with Dec * (SK * , ·) which is defined as follows:
We claim a stronger statement, namely that for all r, the outputs of Games 1 and 2 are statistically indistinguishable. First, indistinguishability of the two modes imply that the view (PK, K * b , C * ) in Games 1 and 2 are statistically indistinguishable. As such, it suffices to show that for all PK, Dec ′ (SK, ·) and Dec * (SK * , ·) agree on all inputs (u, τ ). Let s denote the unique value such that (u, s) ∈ R PP (if no such s exists, then both Dec ′ and Dec * return ⊥) and let TAG = TCR(u). We consider three cases: 
Games 2 and 3 are identically distributed by correctness of the all-but-one mode. GAME 4: REPLACING G(s * ) WITH RANDOM. We generate K * 0 at random from {0, 1} k instead of using G(s * ) (recall here that (u * , s * ) = SampR(r)). Observe that in Game 3, we never use knowledge of the witness s * or randomness r associated with u * . It follows from the pseudorandomness of G that Games 3 and 4 are computationally indistinguishable. Specifically, we may transform any distinguisher for Games 3 and 4 into a distinguisher K * 0 and G(s * ), given PP, u * and oracle access to R PP (the latter to simulate Dec * ).
We conclude by observing that in Game 4, both K * 0 and K * 1 are identically distributed, so the probability that b ′ = b is exactly 1/2.
⊓ ⊔
Instantiations from Hardness of Factoring
We present a simple extractable hash proof for the iterated squaring relation from Section 2.2, namely R
where N is a Blum integer. We also present an efficient ABOextractable hash proof for iterated squaring that avoids the linear blow-up incurred by the transformation in Section 3.2. Both of these extractable hash proofs appear implicitly in the Hofheinz-Kiltz cryptosystem [25, 26] . PUBLIC EVALUATION / EXTRACTION.
N and ⊥ otherwise Correctness of the extraction mode follows from the following simple calculation:
Correctness of the hashing mode follows from the observation that 2 k ·SK * = 2 k ·SK+1 (mod ϕ(N )/4) and thus 
Correctness of the ABO-extraction mode is similar to that for the extraction mode.
Gen(PP), PP = (N, g): 
Dec(SK, C): 
Instantiations from Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
We present an ABO-extractable hash proof for the Diffie-Hellman relation from Section 2.2, namely R dh
where G is a group of order q and PP = (g, g α ).
The construction is implicit in [5] and also [7, 27, 28, 23] . Applying the transformation in Section 3.4 to this hash proof system and the generator G bddh PP (·), we obtain a variant of the BDDH-based IND-CCA KEM in [7, 27] (see Fig 4) . Proof (sketch). Trapdoor generation, public sampling and trapdoor inversion are straight-forward, so we only sketch the reduction for establishing adaptive one-wayness, which is very similar to that for our IND-CCA KEM in Section 3.4. Given an adversary A that breaks adaptive one-wayness with probability ϵ, we may construct an adversary B given (PP, u) and oracle access to R PP , computes s with probability roughly ϵ: ⊓ ⊔ Instantiating this construction with the ABO-extractable hash proofs in Sections 4.2 and 5.1, we derive the adaptive trapdoor relations shown in Fig 6 and 7 , whose security are based on hardness of factoring and Strong DH respectively. By using the ABO-extractable hash proof in Section 5.2, we may also obtain an adaptive trapdoor relation based on CDH.
